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GDP in the Second Quarter of 2006 
Dimitar Chobanov 
The National Statistical Institute (NSI) has 
released data for the gross domestic product 
(GDP) for the period from the beginning to the 
end of June 2006. The real GDP growth for the 
second quarter relative to the corresponding 
period of 2005 was 6.6%, which is the highest 
value of this indicator since 1998 when the 
growth rate was high due to the recovery of the 
economic crisis. The real growth rates continued 
to be above 5% since 2004 and have even 
accelerated. However, one should consider the 
preliminary character of the data before making 
any general conclusions. 
The causes for this positive development can be 
found in the economic policies implemented 
since 1997 when some pro-market reforms were 
undertaken. These are the introduction of the 
currency board arrangement, which relieved the 
inflation expectations and provided stability to 
the Bulgarian lev so it could be used as a 
medium of exchange without baring a 
substantial depreciation risk. Thus the 
uncertainty concerning the price dynamics 
decreased which considerably cut the 
expenditures of citizens and companies to hedge 
from the influence of inflation. 
However, sound money itself is not enough for 
the acceleration and maintenance of high 
economic growth rates. The rest of the reforms 
that were aimed at expanding the economic 
liberty also contributed to the achievement of 
better results. Privatization, although 
incomplete, is one of the reasons for the rising 
efficiency of the economy as unproductive jobs 
were cut and the released human and physical 
capital was directed to more profitable activities. 
Another factor that had a positive development 
was the removal of some obstacles to the 
exchange and especially to the external trade 
where some excise duties and other limitations 
were reduced or removed thereby enabling 
Bulgarian consumers greater opportunities to 
choose between different goods and services. 
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Apart from this, companies in the country 
confronted stronger competition in the internal 
as well as the international markets because in 
many industries, they were no longer 
“protected” by the government. Thus they were 
forced either to produce more efficiently, at 
lower costs or more qualitative products, or to 
drop out from the market. 
Another factor for realization of positive 
economic growth was the free movement of 
capital from and to the country. This condition 
was directly related to the steady functioning of 
the currency board arrangement as well as the 
integration of Bulgaria to the European Union. 
Formation and attraction of capital was the basis 
for the acceleration of economic development 
and the capital account liberalization was a 
crucial factor for this. 
Along with the progress in some areas, during 
the last years there was a stagnation or even 
deterioration in others. For example, the judicial 
system and the police force did not succeed in 
providing the necessary security to individuals 
and protection of their property. Similarly, 
investors bore higher risk because the process of 
debt collection was very slow as well as more 
expensive than the average for the European 
countries. 
Another area deserving a special attention is 
education. It is aimed at preparing persons for 
labor market participation by making them more 
flexible and accommodating. However, 
centralized governance, obsolete programs and 
resistance to any changes in the system led to 
worsening results in international comparisons. 
The connection between the actual demand by 
companies and supplied skills and abilities by 
persons was missing because the education is 
inadequate. In the long term, this could restrict 
the opportunities for economic growth. 
Moreover, even at present there is a deficit of 
specialists in certain industries, which is an 
obstacle for their faster development. 
Generally, activities dominated by the 
government were featured by low efficiency and 
slower development. The private sector was the 
generator of economic growth. In the second 
quarter of 2006 the value added increased by 
7.3% while for the first half it was 7.9% in real 
terms. The function of the public sector is to 
redistribute value created by the private one. 
Even if one assumes that the public sector 
creates value according to the NSI data it 
continued decreasing in real terms. 
During the quarter, the fastest growth was 
realized in manufacturing (9%) which was the 
reason for the rise of its share in the economy. 
The development of services was slower (4.7%), 
while in agriculture there was a slump (-1.1% in 
real terms). The situation in agriculture during 
2005 (decrease of 5.8% in the second quarter) 
could be attributed to a large extent to the effects 
of floods but it should be offset in 2006. 
Problems in agriculture, however, seem to 
deepen and the EU accession will not resolve 
them. 
Consumption continued its steady growth, which 
is due to the private consumption (real growth of 
7.4%) while the collective grew moderately in 
real terms (1.2%). Investment measured by the 
gross fixed capital formation kept rising 
significantly (20% in real terms), which is an 
indication of higher optimism among investors 
due to the forthcoming EU membership. Thus 
the share of investment in GDP climbed to 25%; 
a feature of fast developing economies. 
Growth in investment was combined with the 
unchanged share of gross saving at about 16% of 
GDP resulting in higher current account deficit. 
As far as the share of savings is not raised, 
external savings should be used in which case 
the current account deficit would remain. 
Generally, data show the positive trend of the 
Bulgarian economy. The real growth rate is 
higher than in the older EU member states but 
the comparison to the fastest developing 
countries in the EU is not in favor of Bulgaria. 
During the second quarter of 2006, the real 
growth of GDP in Lithuania was 8.4%, in Latvia 
it was 11.1% and in Estonia it was 12.4%.1 
These are the countries whose economic policies 
are examples of successful reforms leading to 
the faster increase of incomes. Hence the pattern 
is clear and it should be applied dependent on 
the Bulgarian specifics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  According to the Central Statistics Bureau of Latvia 
data. 
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An Overview of the World Bank’s annual 
report: “Anti-Corruption in Transition 3: 
Who is succeeding… and Why?” 
Metodi V. Metodiev 
 
In the 16 years since the start of transition in the 
former socialist economies of Europe and 
Central Asia, few issues have risen as rapidly in 
visibility as corruption. Reforms in the early 
1990s were focused on macroeconomic 
stabilization, price and trade liberalization, 
privatization, and establishment of the legal 
foundations of a market economy. Institutional 
reforms to ensure accountability, transparency, 
and public sector effectiveness often took a back 
seat. Corruption has been an important issue in 
the discussions surrounding EU enlargement, 
has figured prominently in political campaigns, 
and has been a key concern of citizens, 
businesses, and international organizations alike. 
Leading reformers have in turn paid greater 
attention to governance issues generally and 
corruption in particular in recent years. 
This week was introduced the World Bank’s 
report – “Anti-Corruption in Transition 3: Who 
is succeeding… and Why”.  This report was the 
third in a series of studies, since 2000 that 
examines patterns and trends in corruption in 
business-government interactions in Europe and 
Central Asia and the progress achieved by 
countries in addressing it. All three studies have 
drawn on data from a large-scale survey of 
enterprises undertaken jointly by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
the World Bank—the EBRD-World Bank 
Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS). 
 
We attempt to represent an overview of the key 
findings of this report: 
1) Corruption does not affect all firms equally. 
New, private, domestically owned firms are 
likely to pay the most in bribes (as a share of 
revenues) and pay bribes the most 
frequently. Foreign-owned firms pay less in 
bribes, as do larger or older firms, state-
owned firms, and firms in smaller towns or 
rural areas. This uneven incidence of bribery 
threatens to undermine the growth of small 
and medium enterprises, which are the 
engines of economic growth, diversification, 
and private sector development throughout 
the region. 
2) A few of the transition countries of Europe 
and Central Asia, firms reported a smaller 
incidence of corruption in 2005 than they 
had three years earlier. Among countries 
showing the most dramatic improvements 
are Georgia and the Slovak Republic, where 
committed leaders are implementing strong 
programs of economic and institutional 
reform and firm-level bribery has fallen 
substantially. Likewise, Romania and 
Bulgaria are also seeing some success, 
which bodes well for their entry into the 
European Union, and improvements are 
evident along some dimensions in Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Latvia (an early 
leader in tackling corruption), as well as 
several other countries. 
3) Taxation has been one of the most visible 
areas of reform in recent years. Chronic tax 
evasion in the 1990s was driven in part by 
high and steeply progressive rate structures, 
and several countries in Europe and Central 
Asia took the lead world-wide in moving to 
low- or flat-rate income taxes in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. These tend to be the 
same countries that have seen the largest 
declines in both corruption in tax 
administration and tax evasion. In the 
Slovak Republic, for example, a 
comprehensive tax and benefit reform did 
not result in significantly lower collections 
despite a decrease in rates. 
4) Two other areas where reforms are leading 
to lower levels of corruption in some 
transition countries are customs and 
business regulation. Cross-country evidence 
shows that countries with less burdensome 
regulatory systems tend to have lower levels 
of corruption. 
5) One area that has not seen overall 
improvement in firms’ assessment is the 
courts. Only a handful of countries saw 
significant reductions in corruption in the 
judiciary from 2002 to 2005, and a similar 
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number saw increases. Judicial reforms 
tended to take a back seat in the 1990s to 
other areas of institutional reform, although 
this is now changing, particularly in EU 
candidate countries. 
6) Progress is also lagging, according to firms, 
in the area of government procurement. 
Improving procurement systems—focusing 
on transparency, competition, and 
standardization—must be a key priority for 
governance reforms in the coming years. 
7) Corruption continues to be higher in 
countries where policies and institutions are 
weak. While richer countries tend to have 
better institutions and lower corruption, 
there is no evidence that faster economic 
growth reduces corruption in the short run. 
 
From the exported data, we can lay down 
several areas in which Bulgaria needs quick and 
considerable reforms: 
1) The area, which causes major problems for 
Bulgaria, is court and legislation. It is in 
this direction, the base issues of problems is 
the fairness of the courts and the 
independence of the court. The index of 
Economic Freedom of The World is 
published by the Fraser Institute and 
measures the degree to which the policies 
and institutions of countries are supportive 
of economic freedom. They measure the 
degree of five major areas: 1) size of 
government; (2) legal structure and security 
of property rights; (3) access to sound 
money; (4) freedom to trade internationally; 
and (5) regulation of credit, labour, and 
business.) In the annual report, the experts 
of Fraser Institute have concluded that in 
Bulgaria there is no progress in the section 
consisting of the legal structure and security 
of property rights. There is neither an 
institution nor practice to conduct a 
regulatory impact assessment in the pre-
adoption phase of the legislation process. 
2) In second place it is correct to mark the 
situation with the tax burden. The heaviest 
burden is applied to the labor and in 2006 
the rate is between 29% to 43% for gross 
wage of EUR 81.8 and EUR 715.8 
respectively while in 2005 the rates were 
33% and 46%. As a result of the progressive 
personal income tax and regressive payroll 
tax, the average income persons pay the 
highest rates while low and high income 
persons pay relatively less. Corporate 
income taxed was (in 2006) kept unchanged 
at 15% while taxation on dividends was 7%. 
Currently, there are at least 7 countries 
taxing the corporate profit with lower rates. 
The VAT rate is one of the highest all over 
the Europe and 15 countries have lower rate. 
The excise duties rates are still relatively 
low but are increased every year. 
3) The third important component is the 
trouble of the state administration and the 
conditioning of business. Bulgaria faces 
great challenges to achieve the necessary 
quality of administration and administrative 
services and at the same time, to find its 
place in the common European process of 
applying the principles of effectiveness, 
transparency and accountability of 
governance. On the verge of the accession 
of Bulgaria to the European Union (EU), the 
pace of the reforms in the state 
administration is still unsatisfactory.  
 
The major areas where optimization and 
development are a considerable necessity 
are: 1) achieve not a larger, but better 
organized and effective state administration 
2) avoid overlapping structures and 
functions 3) merge or remove structures 
where is possible and appropriate 4) develop 
of a user-friendly e-government 5) enhance 
transparency and integrity in the state 
administration 6) Implement effective and 
efficient training programs.  
4) Bulgaria registered almost zero progress in 
public procurement procedures. There are 
several major problem areas including: 1) 
lack of transparency 2) lack of accurate rules 
3) too many different modes of public 
procedures.   
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Costs and Benefits of Tobacco Tax 
Harmonization in EU. The case of Bulgaria2 
Adriana Mladenova 
 
After the release of the final report of the 
European Commission on Bulgaria on 26th 
September there is no doubt that Bulgaria will 
become an EU member on January 1st 2007. One 
of the various aspects of joining the EU is the 
need for harmonization of the excise duties in 
Bulgaria with the tax regime set in the European 
Union. That means that Bulgaria will have to 
introduce the minimum excise duties on certain 
goods until 2013 – on tobacco products, 
alcoholic beverages, energy and petrol. In this 
article we will review the impacts on the 
Bulgarian economy of the introduction of only 
one type of the duties – the excise duties on 
tobacco. The experience of the ten new EU 
member states serves as an example because 
many of the difficulties that these countries face 
coincide with the problems that Bulgaria meets 
and will have to solve in the process of 
integration.   
Taxes on Tobacco in EU – requirements and 
purposes 
The Derivatives of the Council of the European 
Union amended last in 2002 prescribe the 
following parameters of tobacco tax structure:  
 
• Member States impose a cigarette excise 
duty consisting of a specific and an ad 
valorem component. The minimum total 
excise duty must be 64 Euro per 
thousand cigarettes (1.28 Euro per pack 
of twenty).  
 
• The minimum total level of excise 
taxation on the Most Popular Price 
Category (MPPC) of cigarettes in each 
                                                 
2 The article is based a speech delivered at an 
international conference on “Economic, social and 
security impacts of tobacco excise duty 
harmonization in the EU”, held on 20th Sept 2006 in 
Prague, organized by the Liberální institut. For more 
texts and presentations of the participants please go 
to: http://libinst.cz/data/Tabak_Aj_final.doc 
Member State should be 57% of the 
retail sale price (including VAT). 
 
• States are exempt from this requirement 
if the total excise duty on MPPC 
cigarettes is 101 Euro or more per 
thousand cigarettes (2.02 Euro per 
pack). 
 
• The specific element of the tax should 
be no less than 5% and no more than 
55% of the total tax on the MPPC, 
including the VAT. 
 
There are four general aims of the EU policy in 
the sphere of tobacco taxation. Here are the 
stated purposes and the facts related to them:  
 
? To achieve tax harmonization and 
uniformity – the EU requirement has 
not achieved harmonization of tax 
burdens so far, neither any significant 
convergence of retail selling prices in 
EU.  
? To discourage consumption of tobacco 
products – there is considerable 
substitution away from high-taxed 
cigarettes towards low-taxed tobacco or 
non-duty paid cigarettes. Also, high 
taxes lessen disposable income of 
people and discourage consumption of 
other goods and services.   
? To raise revenues for the government 
– higher taxes lead to an increase in 
smuggling and shadow economy, which 
reduce the government excise and VAT 
revenues. 
? To correct for negative externalities 
from smoking. Smokers impose costs 
on society such as the higher expenses 
of treating smoking-related illness, lost 
of well-being and market earnings as a 
result of illness or death – however, 
smokers tend to live shorter lives than 
non-smokers which saves on pension 
system and healthcare costs of age-
related diseases. Also, the principle of 
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personal sovereignty and the idea the of 
rational consumer are broken by the 
introduction of consumption-
suppressing taxes on cigarettes.      
 
Current situation in the EU 
 
The graph below presents the prices per pack of 
cigarettes in counties of EU as well as in the two 
accession states – Bulgarian and Romania. The 
retail price is divided into pre-tax level and 
overall tax burden that includes specific, ad 
valorem taxes and VAT.   
 
 
Graph 1: Cigarette retail price breakdown  
       (EUR per pack of 20 cigarettes) 
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Source: European Commission, July 2006
 
At present all old EU members (EU-15) meet the 
minimum requirement of 64 EUR tax per 1000 
cigarettes. Relative total tax burdens, which are 
on average 75% of retail price, do not vary 
greatly between most old member states. 
However, there are substantial differences in the 
absolute amounts of total tax burdens and retail 
prices of MPPC cigarettes. The most striking 
and self-evident example is the gap between UK 
and Spain – the price per pack in UK is 7.69 
Euro with an overall tax of 3.05 Euro while the 
price per pack of cigarettes in Spain is 2.25 euro 
with a tax of “only” 1.76 Euro.  
 
Currently, only Cyprus and Malta comply with 
EU cigarette tax regime from all new member 
states (EU-10). The countries have to increase 
current excise duty levels on cigarettes by 
between 18% (Slovenia) and 310% (Latvia). The 
negotiated transition periods of most of them are 
relatively short. The periods are as follow: 
- Dec. 2007 – for Czech Republic and 
Slovenia  
- Dec. 2008 – for Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia 
- Dec. 2009 – for Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania 
 
Once a transit state, Lithuania has become a 
heavy recipient of smuggled tobacco products 
since the process of harmonization to the EU tax 
regime began. Until 2003 large quantities of 
cigarettes were destined for EU-15, and there 
were only small portions for the local market.  
 
• From 2003 affordability decreased and the 
economic incentives for buying smuggled 
cigarettes increased substantially among 
Lithuanians. The result was a boost in 
smuggling for the local market. 
In Hungary, despite a 37% tax increase, in 2004 
the state revenue development dropped below 
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the 2001 level and in 2005, the legal market 
keeps shrinking.   
 
Bulgaria - the new member state from 1st 
January 2007 
Bulgaria has already begun harmonizing its 
excise duty regime on cigarettes since 2002. In 
2006 it increased the excise taxes from 6.1 Euro 
for 1000 cigarettes plus 31.8% on sale price to 
7.7 Euro for 1000 cigarettes plus 48% on sale 
price. As a result, the hike in retail prices of 
cigarettes in 2006 was 62%. The next (and last) 
tobacco price adjustment is scheduled for 2010 
when specific and ad valorem taxes will increase 
by more than 40%. These are preliminary 
projections set in the negotiation program 
between Bulgaria and EU that says that Bulgaria 
has to adopt the acquis communautaire for 
cigarettes till 2010.  
Excise duties on cigarettes were increased earlier 
than required by the European Union because 
the Bulgarian Government aims to have higher 
inflation in 2006 and thus, to avoid it in 2007-
2009 when the macroeconomic indicators of the 
Bulgarian economy will, most likely, be 
scrutinised against the Maastricht criteria for the 
introduction of the euro in Bulgaria in 2009 or 
2010. 
The analysis of the components of tax incidence 
(as of September 2006) shows that the relative 
share of specific taxes to the overall tax burden 
in Bulgaria is lower than the EU averages, while 
the share of the ad valorem exceeds the EU 
averages. Although Bulgaria meets the 
requirements of the EU Directive concerning the 
relative sizes of the tax components, economic 
theory suggests that there are differences in the 
economic impact that different types of taxes 
have on the industry and the market as a whole. 
According to Professor Cnossen from Maastricht 
University ad valorem taxes increase absolute 
price differences, discourage investments in 
quality, promote cheap tobaccos and favor cheap 
homegrown tobaccos.    
  In order to assess the impact of the 
harmonization process in Bulgaria concerning 
tobacco taxation and make a cost-benefit 
analysis of the EU requirements, we need to 
look more closely at the peculiarities in the 
country related to tobacco industry and as such, 
to take into consideration the policy of cigarette 
production in the country. The production of 
cigarettes in Bulgaria is still under the monopoly 
of the state-owned Bulgartabac Holding with a 
market share of more than 90% of the cigarettes 
sold legally on the market. The domestically 
produced cigarettes have been protected by high 
import duties and all cigarettes have been 
subject to price regulations imposed by the 
Government. Tobacco producers have been 
heavily subsidized in comparison with other 
entrepreneurs and as a result, the tobacco 
production in the country is not efficient and a 
lot of farmers will not receive direct payments 
under CAP as they fail to meet the requirement 
of minimum 1 hectare per farm. Control on 
customs has proven weak and corruption 
practices are still common.  
However, the future of the tobacco business in 
Bulgaria is not that dismal. Bulgartabac Holding 
has already begun restructuring its subsidiaries 
and will privatize several of its plants in the 
coming months. Abolishment of fixed prices on 
cigarettes is due in October 2006 and thus the 
market will be liberalized. Import duties on 
cigarettes imported from EU will be abolished 
due to EU accession of the country. New market 
players have recently entered the market such as 
Philip Morris and British American Tobacco, 
which is a clear sign that competition on the 
market has begun its first steps towards 
intensifying. 
The smoking prevalence in Bulgaria is very 
high, around 50% in 2005 of the population 
between 18 and 69. Still, there is a trend towards 
decreasing of smoking in the country, as in 2002 
the prevalence was 59.5%. This tendency, 
however, is not induced by tax changes. Also, 
Bulgarians are among the heaviest smokers in 
Europe according to recent research. Smokers in 
Bulgaria tend to smoke, on average, more than 
20 cigarettes per day. Only Greeks, Cypriots and 
Romanians can compete with Bulgarians by this 
indicator.   
Also, Bulgaria ranks first in the EU by the 
percentage of total agricultural land devoted to 
growing tobacco. In absolute figures, the country 
is passed only by Greece by the indicator 
“hectares of land devoted to growing tobacco”.  
Findings for Bulgaria 
The impact of applying EU cigarette tax regime 
in Bulgaria is as follows.  
 
1. Affordability of cigarettes decreases 
substantially in Bulgaria.  
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The retail cigarette prices in Bulgaria are lower 
than in most of the EU members, but in real 
terms (cigarette prices relative to personal 
disposable income) they are much higher 
compared to the EU benchmark.  
The increase of cigarette prices will be 
considerably greater than the expected growth in 
disposable income per capita in Bulgaria. Given 
the great percentage of smokers in the country, 
the high tax rates will have a negative impact on 
overall consumption and savings of people, 
which means less economic growth for the 
economy.  
2. Increased smuggling, cross-border shopping 
and bootlegging.    
Due to the hike in excise duties at the beginning 
of the year, Bulgaria now experiences an influx 
of smuggled cigarettes, which the industry 
suggests account for more than 15% of the 
market. The retail prices of cigarettes are already 
higher than in its neighbors Romania, Serbia, 
Macedonia and Turkey. Also, legal purchases of 
cigarettes in duty-free shops have risen by 24% 
for the first 6 months of 2006.   
3. Reduction of purchases of domestic brands, 
which harms domestic tobacco producers and 
manufacturing workers.  
Bulgartabac’s sales fell by 24% on an annual 
basis in the first half of 2006, while revenues 
from core operations fell by 48%. We observe 
substitution from Bulgarian brands to imported 
brands – Serbian and Turkish brands are the 
main substitutes in the “cheap” category, and 
many also prefer to buy duty-free “expensive” 
brands.   
 
4. Fiscal losses due to fewer revenues from 
direct and indirect taxes.  
The increase of smuggling and sales in duty-free 
shops means less VAT and excise taxes paid to 
the government. In the first half of the year, 
revenues from excise duties account for 45% of 
the expected annual excise revenues for 2006. In 
comparison, all other tax revenues account for 
more than 50% of their annual expected levels. 
That means that revenues from excise duties are 
lagging behind all other taxes. In addition, less 
consumption of legal cigarettes means a forgone 
amount of VAT payments, while losses in 
tobacco industry means less corporate tax 
payments.   
5. Undermining of public confidence in the 
fairness of the tax system. 
6. Taxes hurt the poor much harder than the rich 
– cigarette excise duties are discriminatory and 
highly regressive. 
7. Privatization of the state-owned cigarette 
companies will be even harder in such an 
environment – tax harmonization impedes 
competition in the sector and set rules that are 
not in the interest of all market players.  
8. Higher taxes increase incentives for fraud, 
bribery and corruption practices.  
Conclusion 
Our general recommendations are for tax cuts 
and abolishment of the requirement for 
minimum tax burdens on tobacco products 
within the EU. The tobacco excise duty 
harmonization in EU fails to meet the stated 
purposes, and at the same time the costs that are 
imposed on the economy are not taken into full 
account by policy-makers. Tax competition, not 
tax harmonization is the right step for fighting 
with the black market and encouragement of 
investments in research and development of 
healthier products. We believe that the European 
Commission should review its tax policy and 
launch an EU-wide debate on the abolishment of 
the minimum level of excise duties in the 
member states. 
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Labor force migration – negative or rather 
positive impact on the immigration country? 
Veliko Dimitrov 
 
Over the last month there have been many 
articles in the British press questioning whether 
after Bulgaria and Romania join the EU, workers 
from those two countries should also enjoy a 
free access to the UK labor market. Most of the 
released journalists’ and acting labor party 
politicians’ opinions were as expected in favor 
of introducing some sort of restrictions, while 
the rest, only a tiny fraction, stressed the 
importance of not offending free market 
principles.   
Although the free movement of people belongs 
to the fundament on which the EU was once 
created, this constellation should actually not be 
so surprising, bearing in mind that decisions 
based on political arguments sometimes supplant 
economic-based ones. Or so an acting labor 
party minister contends “… sometimes politics 
should get the upper hand over economics”.     
 
How far do politics and economics diverge in 
this case? 
There is no valid economic argument in defense 
of implementation of labor market restrictions. 
Labor force, as a factor of production does not 
generally differ from all others – no matter if it 
is up to a computer, an iron sheet or human 
skills. If there is the possibility to obtain them 
from various sources you simply pick the most 
advantageous one. The higher competition level 
on the resource market, which would be 
provoked by the participation of potential 
Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants, is the 
natural prerequisite for the British companies to 
become more competitive and to be able to sell 
their products at a lower price. And in reverse, 
the more restrictions on the resource market, the 
less chances for business to take up a better 
position both inside and outside the country. 
These and similar arguments are subject to no 
doubt even by the supporters of immigration 
policy protectionism.         
Quite differently grounded is their major 
argument in favor of sheltering the labor market; 
it merely says that as a result of the growing 
supply of foreign workers, unemployment and 
therefore the social security payments will rise. 
That is generally possible however available 
statistical data does not verify this point of view. 
Three out of 15 old EU member states did not 
set up restriction mechanisms toward workers 
from the new accession countries. The table 
below provides the unemployment rates at and 
after the date of accession in those three 
countries.     
Table 1: Unemployment rates before and after 
joining the new member states 
 01, May 
2004 
01, January 
2005 
UK 4,7 % 4,7 % 
Ireland 4,5 % 4,3 % 
Sweden 6,6 % 6,2 % 
Average for the 
three countries 5,26 % 5, 06 % 
Source: Eurostat  
As shown, for a period of eight months, 
unemployment in the three countries has not 
increased and has even decreased in two of 
them. As some would suggest, this is not due to 
a lack of any immigrants (in the UK alone more 
than 127 000 people have been registered*), but 
to the creation of new, occupied, free, and 
coming out of the shadow economy working 
places.  
On the other hand, the additional employment 
and competition have, on average, contributed to 
about 30% higher GDP growth in 2004 
compared to the previous year. 
Table 2:Real GDP growth rates (at constant prices 
for 2000; percentage change on previous year)  
 2003 2004 
UK 2,7 % 3,3 % 
Ireland 4,3 % 4,3 % 
Sweden 1,7 % 3,7 % 
Average for the three 
countries 2,9 % 3,8 % 
Source: Eurostat  
In comparison to the rest of “old Europe” (2,3 % 
average GDP growth), the expansion of the 
economies of the three “open” countries is 
significantly higher**.  
Quite reasonable sounds the conclusion that 
thanks to the greater number of workers and 
increased competition, in particular on the labor 
market, the three open countries are progressing 
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much faster than their neighbors which have 
introduced some sort of entry barriers to foreign 
workers.    
 
I might need to say that the negative impacts of 
immigration are often being hyperbolized, while 
the positive ones almost always remain 
unnoticed (or unmentioned). All of this is mostly 
due to the fact that unlike other factors of 
production – goods, services and capital – the 
labor force and all related issues have much 
greater populist potential, which the political 
elite seldom neglects to fully exploit.    
 
 
*According to official information published 
by the Home Office 
** In fact the difference is even bigger 
because the higher rates of the UK, Ireland 
and Sweden are also included in the 
estimation of the EU15 average growth rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
